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A PERPLEXING PARADOX: “DE-STATIFICATION”† OF 
“INVESTOR-STATE” DISPUTE SETTLEMENT? 
Becky L. Jacobs∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay considers the perplexingly paradoxical demand that states be 
virtually removed from investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). It also briefly 
considers the various critiques of, and possible reforms or adjustments to, 
existing ISDS systems, particularly those related to the right of state parties to 
pursue legitimate public policy objectives, such as the protection of public 
health, safety, the environment or public morals; social or consumer 
protection; or the promotion and protection of cultural diversity. Also 
considered are data and details of the involvement of African states in ISDS. 
The apparent “diversity deficit” pertaining to the participation of African 
nationals as arbitrators and counsel in investment arbitrations is discussed as 
are proposals for the inclusion, integration, and utilization of more African 
nationals into ISDS systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
If you think that conferences are boring, you clearly did not attend the 
Atlanta International Arbitration Society’s (AtlAS) Third Annual Conference, 
Enhancing Business Opportunities in Africa: The Role, Reality and Future of 
Africa-Related Arbitration. The subject of the conference implicated some of 
the most important and controversial aspects of international arbitration, and 
the dialogue among attendees reflected that debate. It was, to put it mildly, 
spirited. 
My panel focused on arbitrating with the state—a complicated topic, facets 
of which were the subject of several panels at the AtlAS conference and which 
also are being debated in political and academic circles, in the press, and on 
 
 † This term is derived from the title of an article co-authored by the Honorable Charles N. Brower, a 
venerated international arbitrator. See Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, From “Dealing in Virtue” to 
“Profiting From Injustice”: The Case Against Re-Statification of Investment Dispute Settlement, 55 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. ONLINE 45, 45 (Jan. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Brower & Blanchard, The Case Against Re-
Statification]. 
 ∗ Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee College of Law. 
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television as the United States (U.S.) negotiates the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP)1 and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).2 
Many critics of international investment agreements, or IIAs, such as these, 
including U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, have focused on their investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions: 
Agreeing to ISDS in th[ese] enormous new treat[ies] would tilt the 
playing field in the United States further in favor of big multinational 
corporations. Worse, it would undermine U.S. sovereignty. 
ISDS would allow foreign companies to challenge U.S. laws—and 
potentially to pick up huge payouts from taxpayers—without ever 
stepping foot in a U.S. court. Here’s how it would work. Imagine that 
the United States bans a toxic chemical that is often added to gasoline 
because of its health and environmental consequences. If a foreign 
company that makes the toxic chemical opposes the law, it would 
normally have to challenge it in a U.S. court. But with ISDS, the 
company could skip the U.S. courts and go before an international 
panel of arbitrators. If the company won, the ruling couldn’t be 
challenged in U.S. courts, and the arbitration panel could require 
American taxpayers to cough up millions—and even billions—of 
dollars in damages. 
If that seems shocking, buckle your seat belt. ISDS could lead to 
gigantic fines, but it wouldn’t employ independent judges. Instead, 
highly paid corporate lawyers would go back and forth between 
representing corporations one day and sitting in judgment the next. 
Maybe that makes sense in an arbitration between two corporations, 
but not in cases between corporations and governments. If you’re a 
lawyer looking to maintain or attract high-paying corporate clients, 
 
 1 The TTIP is a very ambitious trade and investment agreement between the United States and the 
European Union. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), OFF. U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). If agreed and implemented, it would be the 
world’s largest trade pact, covering 800 million people and nearly one-third of all global trade. Michaela 
Schiessl, Corporation Carte Blanche: Will US-EU Trade Become Too Free?, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Jan. 23, 
2014), http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/criticism-grows-over-investor-protections-in-transatlantic-
trade-deal-a-945107.html. 
 2 The TPP is the free trade agreement amongst the U.S., Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, OFF. 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-objectives (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). It 
could be a very significant trade agreement for the U.S. as it represents forty percent of world trade and over 
sixty percent of U.S. exports. Joshua Meltzer, TPP: What’s at Stake with the Trade Deal?, BBC NEWS 
(Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27107349. 
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how likely are you to rule against those corporations when it’s your 
turn in the judge’s seat?3 
This Essay will briefly ponder the rather perplexingly paradoxical demand 
by proponents that states be virtually removed from investor-state arbitration, 
with a few thoughts on the impact of this perspective on African States. 
Caveat: this Essay does not focus on any one aspect of arbitration; it is rather a 
hodgepodge of reflections and data that pertain to this one particular 
conundrum that continues to puzzle me.4 
I. BACKGROUND 
As a starting point for my thoughts, I will recount one of the very lively 
exchanges at the AtlAS conference. After the panel in which I participated 
concluded, the panel moderator, University of Georgia School of Law’s Dean 
Bo Rutledge, asked, and I paraphrase, how we, the panelists, would advise 
African States to preserve their ability to pursue public policy objectives when 
negotiating or renegotiating IIAs such as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)5 
 
 3 Elizabeth Warren, Editorial, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-
trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html. 
 4 It also will assume some expertise on the part of the reader regarding the many acronyms associated 
with ISDS and the treaties, documents, and concepts that they represent. 
 5 Bilateral Investment Treaties, or BITs, are agreements between two states that establish a legal 
framework for private investment by nationals and companies of one country in the other country. In addition 
to BITs, there are multilateral investment agreements between more than two countries, such as the TPP and 
TTIP, as well as regional agreements. See generally JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES (1st ed. 2010). Most BITs authorize foreign investors from one of the signatory nations to institute 
arbitral proceedings directly against the other host state treaty party for alleged breaches of the relevant BIT. 
See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent 
Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 2 (2014) [hereinafter Roberts, State-to-State 
Investment Treaty Arbitration]. International arbitral tribunals may, and have, awarded monetary damages 
against host states, awards that are generally enforceable in domestic courts pursuant to the New York 
Convention or other regimes, such as the self-implementing ICSID enforcement system. See generally Crina 
Baltag, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against States, 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 391, 392 (2008). These 
damage awards can be significant. One extreme example of a potentially economically crippling claim arose in 
an arbitration pursuant to a BIT between England and the small South American Republic of Guyana. In its 
2003 claim, Big Food Group (BFG), a supermarket chain based in the U.K., sought £12 million compensation 
from Guyana for a debt related to Guyana’s nationalization of a sugar business in 1975. Calvin A. Hamilton & 
Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral 
Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 22–24 (2005). Before it defaulted during a regional economic downturn, 
Guyana had repaid £6 million of what was an original £13 million debt; following the default, the interest 
increased the debt to £12 million. Id. at 23. There was a large public outcry against BFG’s actions: “The 
group’s [BFG’s] turnover, at £5.2 billion, dwarfs Guyana’s GDP, which stands at £2.15bn. Its government’s 
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or investor-state contracts and/or are drafting domestic investment statutes. My 
response, which was to suggest that states make explicit exceptions for 
domestic priorities and/or provide policy-related limitations on investor 
protections, provoked quite an impassioned and colorful response from several 
attendees. I will try to reconstruct the gist of some of the relevant dialogue: 
Me: Let me start by saying that, while we all have heard the calls for radical 
reform of the investor-state dispute settlement system, even for its total 
elimination, I am not among those who believe that drastic measures 
are required. I also, however, am not among those who staunchly 
defend every aspect of the field, and there are a number of things I 
would recommend to African States. First, at a minimum, I would 
advise these States to more expansively apply the “national interest” 
principle; perhaps to include language similar to that found in Annex 
B(4)(b) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT explicitly recognizing that non-
discriminatory regulatory actions designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public policy objectives do not constitute indirect 
expropriations or, additively or alternatively, to exclude disputes 
related to such regulatory actions from arbitration or make them non-
justiciable.6 States could also expressly provide that all investor 
protections must be “consistent with” other sovereign objectives and 
prerogatives, including sustainable development, human rights, 
environmental protection, etc.7 They also could limit the applicability 
of their agreements and statutes to investors with substantial business 
 
entire annual income is just £120m—and Big Food Group is demanding a tenth of that.” Id. Apparently in 
response to this opposition, BFG dropped its claim. Id.  
 6 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 41 (2012), http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/188371.pdf [hereinafter 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT]. Annex B(4)(b) reads: “Except in rare 
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute 
indirect expropriations.” Id. I also would advise African States to carefully consider expanding the list of 
public welfare objectives to include items of particular societal concern to avoid expressio unius, ejusdem 
generis or other interpretive issues. Another suggestion would be that these States carefully define what 
constitutes an “investment” in investment agreements to avoid surprises in an arbitral process or conflicts with 
its domestic law. For a thorough discussion of the current practices regarding the definition of investment in 
international investment agreements and a number of relevant arbitral rulings, see MAHNAZ MALIK, INT’L 
INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., BULLETIN #1 DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS 1 (2011), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/best_practices_bulletin_1.pdf. 
 7 This is similar to language found in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT. See 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 
6, at 16–18. 
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interests in both the host and its claimed home state8 or otherwise limit 
investor access to ISDS to specific agreements or protections.9 
Attendees’ Comments: 
  The claims regarding arbitral interference with state sovereignty are 
“propagandistic screed.”10 
  The data are clear that generally applicable regulatory measures rarely 
if ever give rise to expropriation, except in situations where a state has 
failed to honor a commitment made to induce a particular investment.11 
  Investor-state arbitration benefits developing states, is even-handed and 
transparent, and offers great deference to states on policy matters.12 
These positions are espoused by many prominent international arbitrators, 
practitioners, and scholars. Yet, while these ISDS champions somewhat 
derisively refer to doubters as “leftist academics [and] anti-globalization 
groups,”13 it is not only members of fringe groups and liberal politicians who 
 
 8 See, e.g., Agreement Between Canada and the Slovak Republic for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, Can.-Slovak Republic art. XV, July 20, 2010, 2010 Can. T.S. No. E105168.  
 9 Under the current system, foreign investors are able to carefully structure their business arrangements 
in order to claim favorable investment protections. For example, if their home countries do not maintain an IIA 
with the desired host state, sophisticated investors may funnel their investments through a business entity 
formed in a third country with which that host state does maintain an IIA. Alternatively, they might seek to 
utilize a Most Favored Nation clause in a favorable host state treaty. See, e.g., Julie Maupin, Public and 
Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 367, 379–80 
(2014). Scholar Maupin uses the high profile and very controversial Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth 
of Australia dispute to illustrate the impact of this structured forum shopping. In that case, Philip Morris, a 
company incorporated and managed primarily in the U.S., claimed jurisdiction though its Hong Kong 
subsidiary in its dispute with Australia over that State’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act and associated 
regulations pursuant to the Hong Kong-Australia BIT. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of 
Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.ag. gov.au/ 
Internationalrelations/InternationalLaw/Documents/Philip%20Morris%20Asia%20Limited%20Notice%20of%
20Arbitration%2021%20November%202011.pdf.  
 10 Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme—The Truth about Investor-State 
Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 5 COLUM. J. TRANS’L L. 689, 691 
(2014) [hereinafter Brower & Blanchard, What’s in a Meme]. 
 11 Brower & Blanchard, The Case Against Re-Statification, supra note †, at 54 n.39 (citing Methanex 
Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and the Merits, 44 I.L.M. 1345, pt. IV, ch. 
D, ¶¶ 7–9 (Aug. 3, 2005); S.D. Myers v. Canada, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 1408, ¶¶ 281, 285 (Nov. 13, 2000); 
Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶ 266 (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/documents/ChemturaAward. 
pdf; Waste Mgmt. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/2, Award, ¶ 98 (Jan. 17, 2000); Revere Copper & 
Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 17 I.L.M. 1321, 1331 (Feb. 26, 1980)).  
 12 See, e.g., Brower & Blanchard, The Case Against Re-Statification, supra note †, at 45. 
 13 Id.; accord Brower & Blanchard, What’s in a Meme, supra note 10, at 691. 
JACOBS GALLEYSPROOFS2 11/9/2015 2:40 PM 
22 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
are raising questions about international investor-state arbitration. The U.S. has 
been further delineating its sovereign policy space in free trade agreements 
since 2004, and the European Commission has indicated that it will reserve the 
right of state parties to regulate “through measures necessary to achieve 
legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, 
environment or public morals, social or consumer protection or promotion and 
protection of cultural diversity” in all current and future E.U. investment 
negotiations, including the TTIP.14  
Distinguished scholars such as Erwin Chemerinsky, Barbara Black, Martha 
Field, David Luban, and more than eighty others have written to Congressional 
leaders to oppose the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement provisions 
in the TPP and TTIP.15 Even the current, and first full-time, Secretary General 
of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
Meg Kinnear, has acknowledged that many of the criticisms of the Centre are 
“thoughtful” and that the ICSID should “listen carefully” and “consider 
concrete responses.”16 Similarly, imminent ISDS arbitrators have publicly 
acknowledged that a vigorous response to criticism of existing models “does 
 
 14 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Why Are We “Re-Calibrating” Our Investment Treaties?, 4 WORLD ARB. & 
MEDIATION REV. 143, 143–44 (2010). A 2009 report of a U.S. State Department Advisory Committee 
recommended that ISDS be replaced with a state-to-state mechanism in U.S. BITs and other trade agreements, 
or, “[i]f the administration continues to include an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, investors 
should be required to exhaust domestic remedies before filing a claim before an international tribunal. That 
mechanism should also provide a screen that allows the Parties to prevent frivolous claims or claims which 
otherwise may cause serious public harm.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
INVESTMENT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY REGARDING THE MODEL 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: ANNEXES (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2009/131118. 
htm. The Subcommittee also cautioned that investor protection standards contained in U.S. IIAs should not 
provide foreign investors with greater rights than those enjoyed by U.S. investors in the United States. Id. This 
Report reflected the “balanced assessment” of a diverse group of members drawn from industry, labor, 
academia, law firms, and NGOs, many of whom filed accompanying Annexes that expressed their particular 
individual or group views. Id. See also EUROPEAN COMM’N, DRAFT TEXT TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP—INVESTMENT § 2, art. 2 (Sept. 16, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf [hereinafter EU DRAFT TTIP]. The Commission’s TTIP draft text also 
specifies that investment protection provisions shall not be interpreted as a commitment from governments that 
their legal frameworks will not change; clarifies a number of key provisions, including standards of investment 
protection and indirect expropriation; and proposes a permanent Investment Court System comprised of a 
Tribunal of First Instance and an Appeal Tribunal that would replace existing ISDS mechanisms. Reading 
Guide to the Draft Text on Investment Protection and Investment Court System in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Sept. 16, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index. 
cfm?id=1365. 
 15 See Investor-State Dispute Settlement Sign On, ALLIANCE FOR JUST., http://org2.salsalabs.com/o/6539/ 
p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=19342 (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).  
 16 Damon Vis-Dunbar, Meg Kinnear Elected as Secretary-General of ICSID, INV. TREATY NEWS (Mar. 
3, 2009), http:// www.iisd.org/itn/2009/03/03/meg-kinnear-elected-as-secretary-general-of-icsid. 
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not mean that the present system could not be either improved or better 
adapted to what have turned out to be demands from its implementation in 
practice.”17 ISDS has even become popular cultural fodder. The February 15, 
2015 episode of Last Week Tonight with John Oliver had an eighteen-plus 
minute segment on Philip Morris’s ISDS legal campaigns involving the 
tobacco plain packaging legislative efforts in Australia, Uruguay, and Togo.18 
Critics and supporters alike have suggested various possible reforms or 
adjustments. While the most extreme demand would eliminate ISDS entirely,19 
a plethora of others have been proposed, many of which would involve 
abrogating, renegotiating, or amending existing investment agreements and 
treaties; creating new ISDS institutions; reorganizing existing arbitral 
institutions and structures; or bolstering the independence of system 
arbitrators.20 
In this brief Essay, I will not even begin to restate in detail or even list all 
of the proposed reforms. However, as examples, some have urged that parties 
consider or be required to seek mediation or conciliation of their claims prior 
to submitting them to arbitration.21 Other proposals focus on procedural 
reforms of existing ISDS mechanisms, such as making processes more 
transparent, establishing statutes of limitations for the filing of claims, 
 
 17 Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Investment Arbitration: Economic Issues and Replies to Challenges, IBA 
ARB. NEWS (Int’l Bar Ass’n, London), Feb. 2014, at 30.  
 18 See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Big Tobacco’s Still At It (HBO television broadcast Feb. 15, 
2015). 
 19 See, e.g., An Open Letter From Lawyers to the Negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Urging 
the Rejection of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, TTP LEGAL (May 8, 2012), http://tpplegal.wordpress.com/ 
open-letter/. Exercising this “nuclear option” is extreme, but it likely would not, as some have warned, leave 
investors without possible remedies. Investor-state investment contracts, reputation, political and diplomatic 
pressure, or the host state’s self-interest offer “credible commitment” alternatives for the enforcement of state 
obligations. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors 
Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1550, 1571–72 (2009) 
(focusing on investment contracts); Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 444–53 (2008) (citing alternative options for credible 
commitment). 
 20 See generally Ahmad Ali Ghouri, On Genealogy of Proposals to Reform Investor-State Arbitration, 11 
TRANSNAT’L DIS. MGMT. 1, 8 (2014). See also EU DRAFT TTIP, supra note 14, § 3(4) (proposing an 
“Investment Court System”). 
 21 See Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation Into 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 113–14 (2013); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is 
There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM 
INT’L L. J. 138, 140 (2007). See generally Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration, 
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. (2010), http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf. 
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requiring referrals to state party-established panels for interpretive guidance,22 
allowing non-disputing party and amicus interventions,23 amending the rules or 
processes of arbitral institutions to require tribunals to consider non-investor 
rights when deciding investor-state disputes,24 establishing an appellate system 
at the ICSID, or perhaps expanding the annulment process and the role and 
authority of ICSID annulment committees.25 More radical institutional reforms 
have been suggested, such as the creation of a single, consolidated ISDS 
institution26 or of an international investment court comprised of a bench of 
full-time, tenured judges with jurisdiction to “apply public law principles when 
deciding on public interest issues.”27 Alternatively, some have recommended 
that investor-state disputes involving sensitive matters with public international 
law implications be referred to the International Court of Justice.28 
Many of the reform proposals relate specifically to the arbitrators, their 
qualifications, the process by which they are selected, the ethical standards to 
which they should be held, their jurisdiction, their standard of review, the level 
of deference that they owe the state action at issue, and their final rulings.29 
Indeed, much of the distrust with ISDS appears to arise from what some 
perceive as the moral hazards to which the arbitrators are subject in ISDS.30 
One commission report in Australia expressed a number of concerns about 
investor-state arbitrators, including: 
 
 22 UNCTAD IIA, REFORM OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: IN SEARCH OF A ROAD MAP 6 
(2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf.  
 23 Id.  
 24 Maupin, supra note 9, at 424–27. 
 25 Ghouri, supra note 20, at 7.  
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. See also EU DRAFT TTIP, supra note 14, § 3(4). Some have questioned the efficacy of such a world 
investment court to address the very issues that it would be designed to correct: “A World Investment Court, 
unless carefully designed as more of a political than a judicial organ, would risk further consolidating the law-
making functions of [international investment law] experts while diminishing the ability of states to control 
system outcomes.” Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 391, 403, 433–34 (2012) [hereinafter Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law 
Agency]. 
 28 Ghouri, supra note 20, at 7. 
 29 See, e.g., NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & DIANA ROSERT, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: OPPORTUNITIES TO REFORM ARBITRAL RULES AND PROCESSES 1, 11–13, 
17 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 IISD REPORT]. See also Sergio Puig, Emergence and Dynamism in International 
Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration, and International Investment Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 531, 
592–93 (2013). 
 30  AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 272 (2010), 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/trade-agreements/report. 
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Institutional bias and conflicts of interest . . . resulting from the fact 
that only investors can bring arbitration claims, and the arbitration 
system relies on investor claims to continue. Further, conflicts of 
interest can arise in cases where the arbitrator in one case acts as 
legal counsel in other cases involving the investor.31 
Arbitrators often simultaneously serve as an expert and as counsel in other 
investor-state disputes.32 They sometimes also shift back and forth from their 
private arbitration practices into public service; several reportedly have played 
official or unofficial governmental roles in the negotiation of the very types of 
IIAs that they adjudicate or litigate in the private sector.33 These arbitrators 
also are influential in the academy, attending academic and professional 
conferences, producing scholarship, and moving into academia.34 
While the individuals who comprise this elite group of arbitrators are 
highly skilled experts and certainly have the highest ethical standards,35 I do 
not think it too unreasonable for states, and for their citizens, to debate the 
propriety of allowing three, non-democratically-elected individuals to decide 
matters that implicate a sovereign’s right to pursue legitimate public policy 
objectives,36 such as the restructuring of a society’s socio-economy, the 
provision of essential public services, or the maintenance of the very fabric of 
public order. This is particularly poignant in this context given that ISDS 
arbitral awards have only limited review mechanisms, either statutorily or 
judicially, within the affected state or as provided by the relevant arbitral 
institution’s governing documents.37 Given the intersecting stakeholder 
interests, it is not particularly productive to frame the debate dichotomously as 
either a strictly “private” or a “public” issue.38 Nor does it, at a minimum, seem 
appropriate to engage in the debate using pejoratives, insults, or hyperbolic 
rhetoric to respond to those who question existing paradigms. 
 
 31 Id. at 273.  
 32 2014 IISD REPORT, supra note 29, at 13. 
 33 Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, supra note 27, at 402, 405. 
 34 Id. at 402–03, 405.  
 35 See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States art. 14, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID 
Convention].  
 36 Xavier Carim, Lessons from South Africa’s BITs Review, COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES, Nov. 25, 2013, 
at 2, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No_109_-_Carim_-_FINAL.pdf.  
 37 Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public 
Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 788 (2008). 
 38 See generally Maupin, supra note 9.  
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Indeed, a number of states appear to be asking those questions and have 
decided that the conventional ISDS narrative is not consistent with their 
developmental priorities.39 Several countries have negotiated trade agreements 
without investor-state arbitration mechanisms40 or have considered 
withdrawing, or actually have withdrawn, from the ICSID Convention or from 
individual BITs, including Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela,41 and Nicaragua.42 
While many have suggested that these actions are based more upon a desire to 
avoid unpalatable awards rather than upon any genuine distrust of the forum as 
a fair and impartial one for the resolution of investment disputes, they do 
signal a growing discontent with ISDS, one not limited to the developing world 
or to polemical ideologues—the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
excluded any investor-state dispute settlement.43 Perhaps more importantly, a 
number of significant states for foreign investment such as Brazil and India 
have yet to accede to one of the most important ISDS treaties, the ICSID 
Convention.44 
 
 39  Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 825, 846 (2011) [hereinafter Franck, The ICSID Effect?]. 
 40 Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., art. 11.16, May 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919, https://ustr.gov/sites/ 
default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf (providing only for consultations 
between the parties on developing procedures for investor-state dispute settlement instead of requiring 
investor-state arbitration of disputes). 
 41 See Karen Halverson Cross, Converging Trends in Investment Treaty Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 151, 163–64 (2012). Note, however, that a denunciation of the ICSID may not totally foreclose a 
nation’s ISDS arbitration obligations depending upon the provisions of its investments treaties. Rather, it may 
simply eliminate one potential arbitral forum. Also, while page limits and time are not sufficient to explore the 
role of custom in this context, some have posited that IIAs, or some clauses thereof, might now be considered 
custom, which potentially would render these withdrawals, etc. . . . meaningless. See Yackee, Controlling the 
International Investment Law Agency, supra note 27, at 429–30 (citations omitted). 
 42 Franck, The ICSID Effect?, supra note 39, at 846.  
 43 Id. at 846–47.  
 44 For those not familiar with the topic, the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, commonly referred to as the ICSID Convention, entered 
into force in 1966 and created the ICSID. See generally ICSID Convention, supra note 35. ICSID was 
“designed to facilitate the settlement of disputes between states and foreign investors [and was] a major step 
toward promoting an atmosphere of mutual confidence and thus stimulat[ing] a larger flow of private 
international capital into those countries which wish to attract it.” INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., 
REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES § 3, ¶ 9 (1965), reprinted in INT’L CTR. SETTLEMENT 
INV. DISP., ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES 40 (2006), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. According to its 2014 Annual 
Report, ICSID has 159 Signatory States, and 150 Contracting States have ratified the Convention. INT’L CTR. 
SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., ICSID ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2014) [hereinafter ICSID ANNUAL REPORT]. ICSID is 
“almost synonymous with the field of international investment law.” Puig, supra note 29, at 533. While there 
are many arbitral institutions that arbitrate investor-state disputes, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
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II. SOME AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS AND DATA 
Within the African continent, South Africa terminated its expiring BITs 
and is restructuring its investment legislation after conducting a thorough 
review of its investment policies.45 One consideration for this undertaking was 
the nation’s involvement in a very high profile ICSID arbitration, Foresti v. 
Republic of South Africa.46 Although not an ICSID Contracting State or 
Signatory,47 South Africa defended a claim by a group of Italian investors 
under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules regarding the implementation of its 
Black Economic Empowerment Policy (BEE Policy) in the context of the 
mining industry.48 The investors argued that South Africa’s Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act effectively expropriated their mineral 
rights by requiring that a certain percentage of the shares in all mining 
companies be owned by “historically disadvantaged South Africans.”49 The 
claims were brought pursuant to two BITs, one between South Africa and Italy 
and another between South Africa and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic 
Union.50 
The arbitration garnered international attention for a number of reasons. Of 
course, much attention was focused on the sensitive political issues attendant 
to South Africa’s post-apartheid efforts to address economic as well as social 
inequity. However, procedural issues related to the arbitration process itself 
also were notable. Four non-governmental organizations, two South African 
and two international, jointly sought to file amicus submissions with the ICSID 
tribunal to contextualize the public interest issues from both local and 
 
based in The Hague and the London Court of International Arbitration, a significant number of existing 
investment laws and treaties, estimated to be nearly eighty percent, contain provisions under which state 
parties consent to submit covered investment disputes to ICSID arbitration. See Franck, The ICSID Effect?, 
supra note 39, at 838. As one ICSID official noted, “ICSID [may not be] the only institution dealing with 
investor-state arbitration but simply the ‘leader.’” Puig, supra note 29, at 579. 
 45 Mohammad Mossallam, Process Matters: South Africa’s Experience Exiting its BITs 3–4 (Univ. 
Oxford Glob. Econ. Governance Programme, Working Paper No. 97, 2015), http://www.globaleconomic 
governance.org/sites/geg/files/GEG%20WP_97%20Process%20matters%20-%20South%20Africas%20 
experience%20exiting%20its%20BITs%20Mohammad%20Mossallam.pdf. 
 46 See generally Foresti v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award (Aug. 4, 2010), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1651
_En&caseId=C90. 
 47 INT’L CTR. SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., 1 THE ICSID CASELOAD–STATISTICS 6 (2015), https://icsid. 
worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202015-1%20(English)%20 
(2)_Redacted.pdf [hereinafter ICSID CASELOAD]. 
 48  Foresti, supra note 46, ¶¶ 64–66. 
 49 Id. ¶ 56.  
 50 Id. ¶ 1. 
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international human rights perspectives.51 The International Commission of 
Jurists also petitioned to take part in the proceedings52 in order to provide 
international law commentary. 
The tribunal granted leave to file written submissions and, despite 
objections from one of the parties, ordered the redacted disclosure of the 
parties’ key filings to these non-disputing parties (NDPs) prior to the 
submission of their written arguments, a groundbreaking step in transparency 
in ISDS procedure.53 While the tribunal did not authorize the NDPs to 
participate in the hearing, it did invite the parties and the NDPs to provide 
feedback concerning the procedure adopted for NDP participation in this case 
and committed to discuss those comments in its final award.54 
Alas, there was no final award on the merits in the Foresti matter. The 
resolution of Foresti is complicated: the parties did not “settle” in the 
traditional sense. During the pendency of the arbitration, the claimants and 
South Africa had reached an agreement regarding the contested mineral rights 
whereby South Africa granted new order mineral rights in exchange for the 
claimants’ commitment to engage in a certain level of business activities in the 
country and to provide an employee ownership program.55 While the claimants 
did not receive full relief, they sought, but did not receive, South Africa’s 
consent to discontinue the proceedings.56 In its Response to the Claimants’ 
Request for Discontinuance, South Africa asked the tribunal to issue a default 
award solely on the issue of fees.57 
The tribunal58 stated that it was: 
[W]illing, and ha[d] been mandated by the parties, to proceed 
to a decision on the allocation of costs; but it wishe[d] to state 
 
 51 Id. ¶ 25. See INT’L CTR. SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., SCHEDULE C ARBITRATION (ADDITIONAL FACILITY) 
RULES arts. 27, 35, 39, 41(3), in ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES (2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/AFR_English-final.pdf.  
 52 E-mail from Eloise M. Obadia, Sec’y of the Tribunal, ICSID, to Jason Brickhill, Legal Res. Ctr., and 
Dr. Carlos Lopez, Senior Legal Officer, Int’l Comm’n of Jurists (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/ita0334.pdf. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id.  
 55 Foresti, supra note 46, ¶¶ 79–82. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. ¶ 83. 
 58 Professor Vaughan Lowe, QC (President of the Tribunal); Judge Charles N. Brower; and Mr. Joseph 
Matthews comprised the panel. Professor Lowe is a British national, and Judge Brower and Mr. Matthews are 
U.S. nationals. See id. ¶ 5. 
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in the plainest possible terms that the resolution of this 
dispute cannot be understood in terms of success or failure for 
either side, but only in terms of the ultimate success of all 
parties in their struggle to find a fair, viable structure for the 
future of this particular part of the South African economy.59  
After a discussion of the parties’ arguments regarding fees and costs, the 
tribunal, in 2010, awarded €400,000 to South Africa in respect of such fees and 
costs and dismissed all claims with prejudice.60 
Following this experience, South Africa engaged in an exhaustive three-
year review of its investment policies, legislation, and agreements. The 
conclusion suggested that, as it was then configured, the system subjected 
“matters of vital national interest to unpredictable international arbitration that 
may constitute direct challenges to legitimate, constitutional and democratic 
policy-making.”61 As a result of this conclusion, South Africa began to legally 
terminate its expiring BITs.62 It also has proposed that both domestic and 
foreign investment be addressed in domestic legislation in the form of the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 2013, a draft of which was 
released for public comment in November 2013.63 The most current version of 
this legislation reportedly introduces a provision pursuant to which the 
government may consent to international state-to-state arbitration after 
exhaustion of domestic remedies.64 
While some have criticized parts of the process by which South Africa 
terminated its BITs,65 it moved deliberately and with full transparency as it 
analyzed and debated its engagement in ISDS. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, 
 
 59 Id. ¶ 113. 
 60 Id. ¶ 133. 
 61 Carim, supra note 36, at 1.  
 62 BITs with sunset or survival clauses would continue to offer protection to covered investors for the 
specified time periods. While, despite the turmoil created by Zimbabwe’s actions within the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), some have posited that South Africa’s obligations under the SADC 
Protocol on Trade and Investment, which, inter alia, requires that Member States allow foreign investors 
access to international arbitration, also might offer protection beyond that provided by the draft Promotion and 
Protection of Investment Bill. See Chantelle Benjamin, Treaty Could Provide Investor Protection, MAIL & 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), http://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-01-00-treaty-could-provide-investor-protection. 
 63 Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, GN 1087 of GG 36995 (1 Nov. 2013), http://www.tralac. 
org/files/2013/11/Promotion-and-protection-of-investment-bill-2013-Invitation-for-public-comment.pdf. 
 64 See, e.g., Peter Leon, Amended Bill Still Takes SA out of Step with Rest of World, BUS. DAY LIVE 
(Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2015/08/06/amended-bill-still-takes-sa-out-of-step-with-rest-
of-world. 
 65 See Mossallam, supra note 45, at 17. 
JACOBS GALLEYSPROOFS2 11/9/2015 2:40 PM 
30 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
took an entirely different approach. As has been reported in detail in at least 
one article published in the Emory International Law Review,66 Zimbabwe on 
several occasions has decided simply to ignore inconvenient, unfavorable 
awards.67 For example, in Funnekotter v. Zimbabwe, an ICSID tribunal 
awarded damages to a group of Dutch farmers whose land was repossessed by 
the Zimbabwe government.68 As far as I can ascertain, these farmers have yet 
to collect their award. They unsuccessfully have sought to satisfy their 
judgment by suing various Zimbabwean commercial entities in the U.S. to 
access their U.S. assets69 and by approaching the European Court in Belgium 
to seize U.S. $45 million worth of diamonds owned by Zimbabwean entities 
that were in Antwerp to be auctioned.70 
Zimbabwe’s resistance to paying international arbitral awards extends 
beyond the ICSID to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
an organization working toward regional economic integration amongst its 
fifteen Southern African Member States: Angola, Botswana, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.71 The SADC Treaty created a Tribunal72 and 
developed a Protocol that established that body’s jurisdiction over 
controversies involving the interpretation or application of the SADC Treaty; 
 
 66 See Drew F. Cohen, A President, an International Tribunal and a Band of Farmers Walk Into 
Constitutional Court—The Last Laugh: Mike Campbell v. The Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 28 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 29, 34–35 (2014). 
 67 In addition to Zimbabwe, there are a number of states (e.g., Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Congo, 
Liberia, and Senegal) that refused to voluntarily pay one or more investment arbitration awards. Charles B. 
Rosenberg, The Intersection of International Trade and International Arbitration: The Use of Trade Benefits 
to Secure Compliance with Arbitral Awards, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 503, 508 (2013). Most nations do honor their 
obligations. Bolivia and Ecuador, for example, have honored awards rendered against them, despite their 
decisions to withdraw from the ICSID Convention and, in the case of Ecuador, from several investment 
treaties. Id. at 509. Argentina did not explicitly refuse to pay the numerous awards against it, but it took the 
very controversial position that that it was not required to pay adverse ICSID awards until the prevailing 
foreign investor initiated formal proceedings in an Argentine court. See Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under 
Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 603, 648 (2013). 
 68 See generally Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimb., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6, Award, ¶ 132 (Apr. 22, 
2009), http://www.italaw.com/documents/ZimbabweAward.pdf. 
 69 See generally Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimb., No. 09 Civ. 8168 (CM), 2011 WL 666227 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 10, 2011). 
 70 Itai Mazire, Zim Wins U.S $45 Million Diamonds Case, ALLAFRICA (Dec. 8, 2014), http:// 
allafrica.com/stories/201412080992.html. 
 71 See SADC Overview, SOUTHERN AFR. DEV. COMMUNITY, http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/ 
(last visited June 11, 2015). 
 72 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community arts. 9, 16, Aug. 17. 1992, http://www.sadc. 
int/files/9113/5292/9434/SADC_Treaty.pdf. 
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the application or validity of other Community documents and actions of the 
Community institutions; disputes between Member States; and disputes 
between natural or legal persons and States after exhaustion of domestic legal 
remedies.73 
In a case somewhat similar to Funnekotter, a group of white farmers sought 
to prevent the Zimbabwean government from evicting them from their land, 
seeking relief both in the domestic courts of Zimbabwe and in the newly 
constituted SADC Tribunal.74 The claimants failed in the Zimbabwean 
system,75 but they secured an award from the SADC Tribunal, which 
concluded, generally, that the Zimbabwean government had breached its 
obligations under the SADC Treaty by denying the claimants the “right of 
access to the courts and the right to a fair hearing” and by acting in a manner 
that “constitutes indirect discrimination or de facto or substantive inequality.”76 
The Tribunal ordered Zimbabwe to compensate those claimants who had 
already been removed from their property and to take no action against those 
still in residence. Zimbabwe ignored its payment obligations, and the 
claimants’ farms were invaded.77 
The SADC Tribunal’s jurisdiction also was a victim of Zimbabwe’s 
unwillingness to pay the award in this claim. Zimbabwe challenged the 
legitimacy of the Tribunal, and the body was suspended.78 It was not 
reconstituted until 2014 with a limited mandate—it no longer has jurisdiction 
over individual investor claims against Member States, only over claims 
between Member States.79 
Zimbabwe is the outlier, of course. On the whole, African countries have 
accepted IIAs and ISDS. Several have even established arbitration centers in 
 
 73 Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community arts. 14–15 (Aug. 7, 2000), 
http://www.sadc.int/files/1413/5292/8369/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof2000.pdf. 
 74 For a thorough description of the convoluted procedural and substantive history of this case, see Daniel 
Hemel & Andrew Schalkwyk, Tyranny on Trial: Regional Courts Crack Down on Mugabe’s Land “Reform”, 
35 YALE J. INT’L L. 517, 520 (2010). See also Cohen, supra note 66. 
 75 Mike Campbell (PvT) v. Minister of Nat’l Sec. Responsible for Land, Land Reforms & Resettlement 
(Jan. 22, 2008), ZWSC 1, 57–61.  
 76 Id. at 51.  
 77 See Out With Those White Farmers, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.economist.com/world/ 
middleeast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14465671. 
 78 See generally Laurie Nathan, The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale, 35 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 870 (2013). 
 79 See Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. Alter, Legitimacy and Lawmaking: A Tale of Three International 
Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 479, 489 (2013). 
JACOBS GALLEYSPROOFS2 11/9/2015 2:40 PM 
32 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
order to offer alternative venues for the ever-increasing numbers of ISDS and 
other international commercial arbitrations, many of which involve African 
parties, both state and private.80 Representatives and participants from some of 
these fora participated in an AtlAS conference panel dedicated to the topic: 
Africa Rising? Prospects for the Emerging African Arbitral Venues. The panel 
discussed the Lagos Court of Arbitration and the International Centre for 
Arbitration and Mediation in Nigeria; the Common Court of Justice and 
Arbitration in Cote D’Ivoire; the Arbitration Foundation of South Africa, 
headquartered in South Africa; the Kigali International Arbitration Centre in 
Rwanda; the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration 
in Egypt; and the Mauritius International Court of Arbitration, in partnership 
with the London Court of International Arbitration, in Mauritius. Also 
mentioned was the plan by the Law Society of Kenya to create an International 
Arbitration Center in Nairobi.81 
Yet, despite these options, investment disputes involving African States 
typically are arbitrated in Washington D.C., Paris, or London82 with tribunals 
comprised of three arbitrators, who also typically are Western, and they are 
represented by predominantly Western law firms.83 
Why do African nations appear far more often as respondents than their 
citizens do as arbitrators in investment arbitrations? Using 2014 ICSID data as 
a sample, seventy percent of ICSID arbitrators are from Western Europe and 
North America; a mere two percent are from Sub-Saharan Africa.84 Compare 
that with the claims data: one percent of ICSID cases involved Western 
European states as host state defendants, yet more than sixteen percent of all 
ICSID cases involved African State respondents.85 Of the 148 individual 
arbitrator appointments made by the parties and by ICSID in 2014, only three 
were nationals of countries from Sub-Saharan Africa.86 The data are similar in 
 
 80 See, e.g., Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Africa and International Arbitration: From Accommodation and 
Acceptance to Active Engagement, 4 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 23–39 (2015). 
 81 For materials from the AtlAS conference Enhancing Business Opportunities in Africa: The Role, 
Reality and Future of Africa-Related Arbitration, see Conference Panel Materials, ATL. INT’L ARB. SOC’Y, 
http://arbitrateatlanta.org/events/atlas-conference-on-africa-related-international-arbitration-nov-4-5-2014-
atlanta/conference-panel-materials/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). 
 82 Won Kidane, The China-Africa Factor in the Contemporary ICSID Legitimacy Debate, 35 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 559, 596 (2014). 
 83 See id.; see also ICSID CASELOAD, supra note 47, at 18. 
 84 ICSID CASELOAD, supra note 47, at 18. 
 85 Kidane, supra note 82, at 562–63, 572–73. 
 86 ICSID ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 26. 
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other arbitral institutions: African arbitrators are not always appointed even in 
arbitral institutions located in Africa.87 To quote one observer, “[a]rbitration is 
dominated by a few aging men, many of whom pioneered the field. In the 
words of Sarah Francois-Poncet of Salans, the usual suspects are ‘pale, male, 
and stale.’”88 This group also has been referred to pejoratively as an invisible 
college, a mafia, a cartel, and a club.89 These derogatory terms do not advance 
the discussion, but the criticisms are not without some basis: one study 
reported that “just twelve arbitrators have sat on a majority of ICSID 
tribunals.”90 
States are partly responsible for this disturbing situation. Pursuant to 
Article 13 of the ICSID Convention, each Contracting State is entitled to 
designate up to four persons to each institutional-level Panel, i.e., ICSID’s 
official Panel of Conciliators and Panel of Arbitrators, from which selections 
are made in individual claims.91 Yet, as of 2013, only 108 of the 158 ICSID 
Contracting States had availed themselves of this entitlement,92 and many of 
these nominations were arbitrators who were not nationals of the nominating 
State. 
Commentators have recounted the many quite rational explanations for 
why this might be so. A common justification is that international arbitration is 
 
 87 See Ofodile, supra note 80, at 5.  
 88 Michael D. Goldhaber, Madame La Presidente: A Woman Who Sits as President of a Major Arbitral 
Tribunal is a Rare Creature. Why?, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 1–2 (2004). 
 89 Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment 
Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 68 n.110 (2010). 
 90 Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, supra note 27, at 406 (citing José 
Augusto Fontoura Costa, Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators: The Creation of International 
Legal Fields, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 11–12 (2011)). Another study identified fifty-two individuals with 
a total of 1,072 ISDS appointments between them, representing fifty-four percent of appointments in all of the 
reviewed, publicly-reported arbitral results from multiple fora. Robert Kovacs & Alex Fawke, An Empirical 
Analysis of Diversity in Investment Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 4 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 
1, 9–10 (2015). While the authors claim that their analysis reveals that these fifty-two ISDS arbitrators “boast[] 
impressive diversity” in several respects, such as professional experience, legal tradition, language skills, and 
public international law expertise, they also admit that “the situation appears grave” as to gender and low-
income country representation. Id. at 26. 
 91 ICSID Convention, supra note 35, arts. 12–16. State designees need not be nationals of the 
Contracting State. Id. § 13(1).  
 92 Chiara Giorgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder? The Perils and Benefits of Empirical 
Research in International Investment Arbitration, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 263, 274 n.63 (2014) 
[hereinafter Giorgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder?] (citing INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. 
DISPUTES, MEMBERS OF THE PANELS OF CONCILIATORS AND OF ARBITRATORS 3–5 (2013), https://icsid. 
worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/ICSID%2010%20-%20latest%20-%20Dec%2019%20 
2014.pdf). 
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an Anglo-European institution with “roots in the economic and legal 
imbalances between Anglo-European and non-Anglo-European countries.”93 
Relatedly, one scholar has opined that “the crisis of legitimacy of arbitration 
and ADR in Africa” has contributed to the underrepresentation of African 
arbitrators in ISDS.94 A perception that arbitration infrastructure is weak in the 
continent lingers despite recent advances.95 
Another factor suggested is the geography, physical and political, of 
Africa.96 The continent is enormous, and borders are restrictive, often making 
travel expensive with convoluted routings. Further, disparate legal systems and 
customs exist within the continent.97 Based upon the contribution of these 
factors, African business and legal professionals often have closer ties with 
their U.S. or European counterparts than with fellow African professionals.98 
While English and French are widely used on the continent, it is reported 
that there are over 2,000 languages spoken in Africa,99 with some 1,500-2,000 
“official” languages in the African Union.100 Accordingly, costly translation 
expenses and communication barriers certainly will influence arbitrator 
selection.101 Continental cultural understandings of familial and social 
relationships also may implicate conflict rules for arbitrators, as can the 
perception of rampant corruption in matters of business.102 
A lack of experience amongst African arbitrators is one of the most 
reflexively quoted excuses for the lack of arbitrator diversity, and, given that 
prior service as an arbitrator appears to be the most important qualification for 
arbitrator selections,103 likely is one of the most significant factors contributing 
to the lack of diversity amongst ISDS arbitrators. This, however, is somewhat 
 
 93 Courtney Dolinar-Hikawa, Beyond the Pale: A Proposal to Promote Ethnic Diversity Among 
International Arbitrators, 4 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 5 (2015). 
 94 See Ofodile, supra note 80, at 1. 
 95 Id. at 5. 
 96 See generally Paul Ngotho, Fellow, Chartered Inst. of Arbitrators, Challenges Facing Arbitrators in 
Africa, Presentation at the East Africa International Arbitration Conference (July 28–29, 2014), http://www. 
ngotho.co.ke/assets/challenges.norfolk.july2014.pdf.  
 97 Ofodile, supra note 80, at 10. 
 98 Ngotho, supra note 96, at 3–5. 
 99 Official and Spoken Languages of African Countries, ONE WORLD NATIONS ONLINE, http://www. 
nationsonline.org/oneworld/african_languages.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).  
 100 Id. 
 101 Ngotho, supra note 96, at 3. 
 102 Id. at 3–5. 
 103 Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 967–
68 (2005). 
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tautological—how can an arbitrator gain experience without being appointed 
or selected to arbitrate? It also begs the question as to what “experience” is 
necessary? One renowned arbitrator opined that a qualified investment 
arbitrator must have experience with substantive investment law, international 
public law, and arbitration proceedings; must be impartial, independent, and 
sensitive to economic, social, and cultural differences; must have good health 
and sufficient time; must be competent to manage facts and numbers; and must 
understand that arbitration is a service industry.104 Given the large number of 
excellent African legal and other professionals, individuals who participate at 
the highest levels of their fields globally, the “lack of experience” excuses ring 
rather hollowly. 
Regardless of the seemingly rational explanations for this situation, 
concerns about this issue are not new ones. African State representatives raised 
the issue of cultural competence and sensitivity during the African legal 
consultative meeting regarding the draft text of the ICSID.105 However, the 
final text of the ICSID Convention requires only that arbitrators be individuals 
of “high moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, 
commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise 
independent judgment.”106 The only references pertaining to arbitrator 
selection that might be considered even modestly related to diversity or 
cultural competence emphasize “the importance of assuring representation on 
the Panels of the principal legal systems of the world and of the main forms of 
economic activity.”107 
Yet, despite this textual silence, the “diversity deficit”108 in practice has not 
gone unnoticed,109 and, despite numerous attempts to quantify results or 
 
 104 Albert Jan van den Berg, Qualified Investment Arbitrators? A Comment on “Arbitrators in Investment 
Arbitrations”, in THE PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS VAN HOUTTE 53, 54–56 
(Patrick Wautelet, Thalia Kruger & Govert Coppens eds., 2012).  
 105 See, e.g., Kidane, supra note 82, at 590–91 (citing INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPUTES, 
CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF LEGAL EXPERTS: SUMMARY RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS (Apr. 30, 1964), reprinted 
in 2 HISTORY OF ICSID CONVENTION 236, 266 (1968)).  
 106 ICSID Convention, supra note 35, art. 14, ¶ 1. 
 107 Id. ¶ 2. 
 108 Kidane, supra note 82, at 579. This “diversity deficit” is not limited to national or racial concerns. 
There are data indicating that, as of May 2010, a total of 247 individuals were appointed as arbitrators, and 
only ten of these were women, or four percent. In ICSID arbitrations, 75% of the 5.63% of female arbitrator 
appointments went to two women, Brigitte Stern and Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, lowering even more the 
general appointment rate of women. See, e.g., Giorgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder?, supra note 
92, at 270–71 (citing Gus Van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in 
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present empirical analyses,110 difficult questions remain unanswered as to the 
impact of the “cultural barrier that the Africans face when appearing before 
tribunals composed largely of Western arbitrators represented by counsel and 
firms who must necessarily share the judges’ cultural backgrounds.”111 
Clearly, states involved in investor-state arbitration urgently need to make a 
commitment to diversify their arbitrator selections by gender, geography, and 
ethnicity, as do the arbitral institutions.112 While ICSID rightly boasts about the 
increasing diversity of its roster of arbitrators,113 that boast is only valid 
contextually. As noted previously, from a purely numerical perspective, the 
record is abysmal. 
While professional reputation and connections obviously influence the 
arbitrator selection process and contribute to this “diversity deficit,” the more 
difficult question is how to address it. It is unlikely that the governing legal 
instruments could be amended to provide for arbitrator diversity in some 
way,114 but opinions abound on alternative solutions. Many agree that it might 
be possible to adopt procedural changes or alter existing practices at the 
institutional level within administering arbitral bodies such as ICSID, the 
London Court of International Arbitration, the International Chamber of 
Commerce, or the Permanent Court of Arbitration to encourage the 
constitution of more diverse arbitrator tribunals. For example, it has been 
proposed that appointing authorities might promote diversity by “strategically 
utilizing” those appointments of co- and presiding arbitrators or members of ad 
 
FDI PERSPECTIVES: ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 193–95 (Karl P. Sauvant & Jennifer Reimer eds., 
2d ed. 2012), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2012/11/FDI-Perspectives-eBook-v2-Nov-2012.pdf). 
 109 A discussion of whether and why diversity matters in the context of arbitrator selection in international 
arbitration is beyond the scope of this article. For further reading on these questions and on the responses 
thereto, see generally Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?, 
35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 480–83 (2013) [hereinafter Giorgetti, Who Decides]. 
 110 E.g., Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L 
L. J. 435 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development and Outcomes].  
 111 Kidane, supra note 82, at 579. 
 112 Trakman, supra note 67, at 661–62. 
 113 “Similarly, ICSID has encouraged the development of a larger and more diverse group of case 
decision-makers, who reflect the diversity of ICSID’s membership. It has adopted practices to propose 
arbitrators and conciliators from all States and of both genders and has made progress in reaching this 
objective. Likewise, Member States have contributed to this objective by designating 82 new persons to the 
Panels of Arbitrators and of Conciliators in the past year.” ICSID ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 5. 
 114 “Diversity could be incorporated in the applicable legal instruments. However, amending the ICSID 
Convention, and amending UNCITRAL and PCA rules to mandate diversity, would hardly be possible.” 
Giorgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder?, supra note 92, at 273. 
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hoc annulment committees that they control.115 One version of this proposal is 
for institutions to adopt a procedural rule that would require that the presiding 
arbitrator, or a sole arbitrator, be a national of a country from a different region 
than either of the parties.116 Pursuant to this option, global regions could be 
consciously defined so as to increase diversity, i.e., geographic regions could 
be divided by ethnicity, by conventional continental divides, or by 
development level, to minimize the dominance of Anglo-European arbitrators 
in a substantial percentage of cases.117 
The arbitral entities also have been urged to be more proactive in 
encouraging parties to select more diverse arbitrators.118 International financial 
institutions too could exert influence over arbitral appointments in claims that 
arise from projects that they fund.119 This influence could be exercised at the 
contracting stage with funding conditions and appropriately tailored arbitration 
clauses and at the time a dispute arises. 
At least one institution that administers arbitrations, the International 
Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR), has taken steps to 
increase diversity among its arbitrators by creating a “Diversity Commitment” 
similar to its very successful “ADR Pledge.”120 This Diversity Commitment 
states: “We ask that our outside law firms and counterparties include qualified 
diverse neutrals among any list of mediators or arbitrators they propose. We 
will do the same in the lists we provide.”121 
 
 115 Susan D. Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the ‘Invisible College’ of International 
Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 429, 499 (2015) [hereinafter Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge]. 
See also Giorgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder?, supra note 92, at 275.  
 116 Dolinar-Hikawa, supra note 93, at 7. 
 117 Id. at 8. 
 118 Cf. Giorgetti, Who Decides, supra note 109, at 483–84. 
 119 See Ofodile, supra note 80, at 57.  
 120 CPR’s Corporate Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation, or the “CPR Pledge,” was launched in 
the 1980’s, and more than 4,000 business entities and 1,500 law firms have signed on. The Pledge commits 
signatories to consider ADR before filing a lawsuit. See ADR Pledges, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION 
& RESOL., http://www.cpradr.org/PracticeAreas/ADRPledges.aspx (last visited Aug. 19, 2015). CPR has also 
introduced a separate 21st Century Corporate ADR Pledge, which not only includes a commitment to dispute-
driven ADR but also to proactive dispute management and system designs. 21st Century Corporate ADR 
Pledge, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RES., http://www.cpradr.org/PracticeAreas/ADRPledges/ 
21stCenturyPledge.aspx (last visited Aug. 19, 2015). 
 121 Sign the Diversity Commitment!, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RES., http://www.cpradr. 
org/PracticeAreas/NationalTaskForceonDiversityinADR/SigntheDiversityCommitment.aspx (last visited Aug. 
19, 2015). One author has compared the CPR Diversity Commitment to the National Football League’s 
“Rooney Rule,” a rule created by Dan Rooney, owner of the Pittsburgh Steelers. This rule requires that all 
teams interview at least one minority candidate for any available head coaching or senior operations position 
and that minority candidates must have the same interview experience as non-minority candidates, including 
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Parties, however, should not need external encouragement. As one scholar 
has noted, many state parties have constitutional or codified laws pertaining to 
diversity, laws that may be applicable to arbitrator selection, both at the 
institutional panel level and in individual claims.122 Further, while all parties 
certainly will seek to appoint arbitrators who will minimize their risk of loss, it 
has been suggested that corporate parties have incentives to promote diversity 
within their legal departments and have the economic bargaining power to 
influence the diversity hiring and arbitrator and other specialist selections of 
their outside counsel law firms.123 
Another proposal would regulate arbitration as a profession, with an 
independent regulatory body and a qualifying exam.124 It also has been 
suggested that clarifying and more closely monitoring the ethical conduct of 
arbitrators would necessarily limit “repeat player” issues and potentially could 
result in an expanded and more diverse pool of arbitrators.125 
Various forms of structured mentorship have been suggested.126 In one 
such proposal, trainees would attend hearings and act as “shadow” arbitrators, 
preparing “shadow” awards and responses to party motions and applications.127 
Similarly, I envision a program in which the arbitration institutions assign 
arbitrator candidates to shadow counsel to the parties as well as to the 
individual arbitrators or tribunals. This not only would provide the experiential 
component of an arbitrator’s “reputational” capital,128 but it also would address 
 
meeting with the same executives for the same amount of time. Barry Leon, Increasing Diversity Among 
Arbitrators and Mediators: The Magic Bullet, 12 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 1–2 (2015). See generally 
Monte Burke, Why The NFL’s Rooney Rule Matters, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
monteburke/2013/01/26/why-the-nfls-rooney-rule-matters/. 
 122 Giorgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder?, supra note 92, at 275. 
 123 See, e.g., Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge, supra note 115, at 498–99. 
 124 See Ingrid A. Müller, Diversity and Lack Thereof Amongst International Arbitrators—Between 
Discrimination, Political Correctness and Representativeness, 4 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 18–20 (2015).  
 125 Puig, supra note 29, at 603–04. 
 126 At least one commentary on the subject rejects mentoring as a means of increasing diversity in 
arbitration: “We consider that implementing mentoring programs to promote (only) the inclusion of women 
and minorities in arbitration is simply offensive, as the very suggestion implies that women and minorities are, 
automatically, in need of mentoring, due to the simple fact of being of the female sex or of a certain race or 
ethnicity.” Müller, supra note 124, at 14. 
 127 Ngotho, supra note 96. Confidentiality concerns would, of course, be managed, as they are in law 
firms and judicial chambers in which clerks and interns work.  
 128 It does not, however, address the deficit of “symbolic capital” among the many prospective arbitrators 
drawn from underrepresented groups and does not distinguish those arbitrators recognized as elite. “In more 
sociological terms, the symbolic capital acquired through a career of public service or scholarship is translated 
into a substantial cash value in international arbitration.” YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN 
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the more elusive element of direct “familiarity” with a candidate’s professional 
qualities. There also have been suggestions for foreign investment moot court 
competitions and awards that would identify and reward legal talent from the 
developing world.129 
Arbitrator candidates might also intern in an innovative Legal Assistance 
Center advocated by one scholar.130 This Center would provide developing 
nations access to the legal authority and expertise necessary to mount a 
competent defense in ISDS disputes.131 Another approach might be to create an 
African arbitration body with the remit to, among other things, regulate the 
practice of arbitration, including organizing and managing arbitration training, 
making arbitral appointments, planning arbitration conferences, and promoting 
African arbitrators.132 
Under one scenario, the arbitral institutions would set either specific 
numeric or percentage goals that law offices, chambers, and business 
associations of arbitrators who seek to remain or be placed on the institution’s 
panels or listings must meet regarding the employment and utilization of 
underrepresented groups such as Africans. Similarly, law firms acting as 
counsel to parties in institutionally-supervised matters might be required to 
meet these goals vis-à-vis the staffing of a particular matter. An arbitral 
organization might also adopt internal policies and external requirements for 
aggressive recruitment, mentoring, training, and utilization programs for 
individual members of underrepresented groups.133 These programs would be 
comparable to those in place for U.S. federal government contractors.134 
 
VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL ORDER 
8 (1996).  
 129 Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 110, at 481. The author specifically mentions the 
Frankfurt Investment Arbitration Moot Court Competition, which reportedly gives an award for the “Best 
Team from a Non-OECD Member Country.” Outline of Rules: Rule 3.3, FRANKFURT INV. ARB. MOOT COURT, 
http://investmenttreatymoot.org/rules/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2015). 
 130 See Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing 
Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 265, 271 (2007). 
 131 See id. at 267, 269. 
 132 Ngotho, supra note 96. 
 133 Cf. Giorgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder?, supra note 92. 
 134 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,935 (Sept. 24, 1965), as amended by Exec. Order 
No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (Oct. 13, 1967). A discussion of the potential relevance and application of the 
WTO agreement and its side agreements to arbitrator diversity issues at the WTO-associated ICSID is beyond 
the scope of this Essay. See, e.g., Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. 
(26th Supp.) (1980) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1981), as amended by Protocol Amending the Agreement on 
Government Procurement, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 12 (1988). It is, however, worth noting that there are 
numerous critiques of the WTO for its apparent indifference to the rights of minority groups and its seeming 
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One might anticipate that institutions and parties alike will object to the 
cost of formal mentoring programs, but the cost of under-inclusion is also high 
in terms of the perception of the very legitimacy of the ISDS system.135 
Considering that the average legal costs for individual ISDS disputes are 
estimated to be between U.S. $1-2 million,136 that ICSID arbitrators are 
entitled to $3,000 per day plus expenses,137 and that elite international law 
firms charge $400-750 or more per hour, per lawyer, the expense of shadow 
trainees surely would not be too onerous or excessive contextually. The cost of 
longer term and greater access for underrepresented groups is, in my opinion, 
certainly worth at least this much to the ISDS enterprise. 
The costs of formal mentoring or training programs could be funded as part 
of the institution’s dispute processing fees in individual disputes or could be 
derived from a more general Contracting State fee designated for such a 
purpose.138 Such fees also could serve as an incentive for the parties to 
negotiate settlements of their disputes before filing formal claims. One might 
also adopt one author’s suggestion of a funding mechanism for mentoring or 
training programs similar to that exercised by the U.N. Trust Fund, which 
provides financing to developing countries for their litigation costs before the 
 
inattention to gender and other minority issues as well as to the impact of the international trade regime on 
these groups. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, Report of the Expert Meeting on 
Mainstreaming Gender in Trade Policy, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.I/EM.2/4 (Mar. 31, 2009); see also Women 
as Economic Players in Sustainable Development, WORLD TRADE ORG. SYMP. PROGRAMME (June 13, 2003), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/symp_devagenda_prog_03_e.htm; LOUISE O’REGAN TARDU, 
GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN TRADE AND INDUSTRY: A REFERENCE MANUAL FOR GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER 
STAKEHOLDERS 21–23 (1999). 
 135 See, e.g., Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge, supra note 115, at 467–69, 504–05. 
 136 See U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, Occasional Note: International Investment Disputes 
on the Rise, at 4, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2004/2 (Nov. 29, 2004), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ 
webiteiit20042_en.pdf; U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, Investor-State Disputes Arising From 
Investment Treaties: A Review, at 8, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4 (2005), http://www.unctad.org/en/ 
docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf (discussing the increase in number of claims). One preeminent arbitrator reported that 
he has “seen cost claims in the range of up to [U.S.] $50 million from each side[]” in arbitral proceedings. 
Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Professor, Univ. of Cologne, Practical Issues and Perspectives of Investment 
Arbitration Involving Russian and CIS Parties, Presentation at the Conference of International Dispute 
Resolution Involving Russian and CIS Companies (Feb. 27–28, 2014), http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/ 
3/14011073487630/bockstiegel_invarb_involving_russian_and_cis_companies.pdf.  
 137 Schedule of Fees, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPUTES (Jan. 2013), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
apps/ICSIDWEB/ICSID%20Document%20Library/ICSID%20Schedule%20of%20Fees%20January%201,%2
02013%20English.pdf.  
 138 For this purpose, a “user fee,” so to speak, that is collected only from those engaged in proceedings 
seems less regressive and more reasonable. 
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International Court of Justice.139 International financial institutions can support 
the development of African arbitrators with funding and with targeted 
“capacity building initiatives.”140 
Mentoring is just one step in an educational process that begins in law 
school. African law faculties should offer more arbitration-related courses, 
both substantive and skills-based. ADR courses in general appear to be quite 
limited in law schools on the continent, due in part to the lack of experience, 
perhaps attributable to historical hostility to international arbitration, but also 
to limited resources.141 Bar and law societies and international arbitration 
institutions can support educational efforts by providing continuing education 
courses on arbitration as well as sponsoring and hosting conferences such as 
the AtlAS conference that generated this symposium. 
The inclusion, integration, and utilization of more African nationals onto 
ISDS tribunals is a work-in-progress. Yet, despite the dismal data on arbitrator 
diversity, African States appear to have managed their investment arbitrations 
well. A 2012 report notes that: 
[Of] the seventy-six proceedings that have been initiated under the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules against African [S]tates, fifty-six have been 
concluded . . . In twenty-one arbitrations (or 38%), the parties settled 
the claims . . . In fifteen arbitrations (or 27%), the claims were 
dismissed . . . Only in thirteen arbitrations (or 23%) have the claims 
been upheld, [and these involved] eleven different states. These are: 
the Central African Republic, Congo Republic (twice), Egypt (twice), 
Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania, Togo, and 
Zimbabwe. In turn, this means that thirty-three African Contracting 
States (or 75%) have either never been involved in ICSID 
proceedings, saw the claims rejected or settled the claims on terms 
that were agreeable to them.142 
This success and these data do not, however, reveal the nationality, race, and 
gender of those who represented these States in their arbitrations and of those 
who presided as arbitrators. 
 
 139 Cf. S.K.B. Asante, The Perspectives of African Countries on International Commercial Arbitration, 6 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 331, 349 (1993). 
 140 See Ofodile, supra note 80, at 57. 
 141 See id. at 49.  
 142 Karel Daele & Mishcon de Reya, Africa’s Track Record in ICSID Proceedings, KLUWER ARB. BLOG 
(May 30, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/05/30/africa’s-track-record-in-icsid-proceedings/. 
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III. A PARADOX: DE-STATIFICATION OF INVESTOR-STATE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
While critics and challenges abound, most remain committed to ISDS in 
some form, and, rather than completely abandon investor-state mechanisms or 
continue to allow states to ignore unfavorable awards, proposals for reform are 
being vigorously debated. 
What is baffling to me is the vehement refusal by the majority of the 
arbitration establishment to entertain even the most modest of proposals that 
would increase state involvement in the interpretation of the treaties to which 
they are parties.143 And some of these proposals seemingly are moderately 
unexceptional, such as providing states with more control over the selection of 
arbitrators in investment disputes,144 or, conversely, abandoning altogether the 
tradition of party-appointed arbitrators.145 
In addition to the reforms already mentioned, other proposals are more 
dramatic, including the creation of an investment court system structured along 
the lines of domestic and international courts or of an ICSID “General 
Assembly” modeled upon the comparable World Trade Organization (WTO) 
body that would be comprised of representatives from all Contracting States.146 
The investment court system would replace the existing ISDS system with a 
more traditional trial and appeal process supervised by publicly-appointed 
judges, and the Assembly would “exercise ‘legislative control’ over arbitral 
tribunals, interpret investment treaties, [issue interpretive statements to clarify] 
standards in existing investment treaties, and amend investment treaties where 
necessary.”147 
Rather than these sorts of “judicial” or “legislative” solutions, a venerable 
line of scholars has suggested an analytical framework for ISDS practices 
based upon an administrative model.148 Under one prescriptive formulation of 
 
 143 Brower & Blanchard, What’s in a Meme, supra note 10, at 695. 
 144 Id. at 696. 
 145 Jan Paulsson, Inaugrual Lecture at University of Miami School of Law (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www. 
arbitrationicca.org/media/0/12773749999020/paulsson_moral_ hazard.pdf.  
 146 See EU DRAFT TTIP, supra note 14, § 3(4) (proposing an “Investment Court System”); Ghouri, supra 
note 20, at 8. 
 147 See EU DRAFT TTIP, supra note 14, § 3(4); Ghouri, supra note 20, at 8. 
 148 Gus Van Harten has espoused the view that ISDS is a sort of transnational public law order that, like 
domestic constitutional or administrative systems, reviews state regulatory actions. GUS VAN HARTEN, 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 72–93 (2007). See generally SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE 
LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN 
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this framework, the U.S. notice-and-comment administrative procedure would 
be adapted to investor-state dispute processing so as to provide states, 
including the state party, the investor party’s home state, and non-party states 
that might be impacted under a multi-lateral treaty, with formal notice as to 
both the filing and details of a particular dispute and with an opportunity to 
submit comments thereupon.149 This is not a radical idea; similar notice 
procedures have been incorporated into several investment treaties, some of 
which even require that treaty parties consult or even formally convene 
meetings of cabinet-level administrators before a dispute proceeds to 
arbitration.150 
A bit more radical is a proposed administrative change151 that would 
require tribunals to submit drafts of their awards to the parties and to affected 
non-parties for comment and to consider any comments before issuing a final 
award, giving particular deference to comments on which the state parties are 
in agreement.152 There is precedent for this, too. For example, the provisions of 
The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
accord disputing parties the right to submit written comments to the presiding 
arbitral panel on that panel’s initial report and authorize the panel to reconsider 
its report after reviewing any such comments.153 The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Comprehensive Investment Agreement requires that 
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law); Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
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law regulatory perspective on ISDS. Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s 
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 149 Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, supra note 27, at 434–40. 
 150 See, e.g., The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement chs. 19–20, 
Aug. 9, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-
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Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93 NEB. L. REV. 313, 318 (2014). 
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 152 Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, supra note 27, at 437–38. 
 153 CAFTA-DR, supra note 150, art. 20.13. 
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an arbitral tribunal give “serious consideration” to the determination of 
Members States on particular issues.154 
Another proposal that responds to calls for reform would expand upon the 
state-to-state arbitral provisions that are contained in a number of investment 
treaties.155 Many international investment treaties authorize treaty parties to 
reach agreement on disputes about the interpretation and/or application of the 
treaty that will bind investor-state tribunals, and, if they fail to reach an 
agreement, they may refer their disagreements to a state-to-state arbitral 
tribunal empowered to issue a binding award.156 
Possible procedural permutations related to state-to-state ISDS are endless, 
e.g., various sequencing approaches to claims that would, alternatively, accord 
priority to the first claim filed157 or specify a hierarchy of claims that would 
always privilege either the state-to-state or the investor-state options.158 Some 
variations are designed to balance the interests of all stakeholders in 
investment disputes. Directly affected investors, for example, could be granted 
the right to intervene in state-to-state cases as they do in the 2012 U.S. Model 
 
 154 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Comprehensive Investment Agreement art. 36(8) (entered 
into force Mar. 29, 2012), http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119035519.pdf (demonstrating 
that this procedure applies specifically to taxation measures).  
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compensation on behalf of their investors, interpretive disputes, and requests for declaratory relief regarding 
treaty compliance. Id. at 29. 
 157 Article 27 of the ICSID Convention provides a prominent example of a type of sequencing, stating that  
(1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in 
respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented 
to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other 
Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such 
dispute. 
ICSID Convention, supra note 35, art. 27. 
 158 Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration, supra note 5, at 18, 22. 
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BIT.159 Preliminary reference mechanisms could be adopted that would require 
that investor-state tribunals stay their jurisdiction pending a joint interpretive 
ruling by the relevant states, or, failing joint agreement, the ruling of a state-to-
state tribunal.160 As to precedential effect, awards in state-to-state arbitrations 
could be binding on the state parties in a specific case and “highly persuasive” 
with respect to future conduct and tribunals, with prospective effect only.161 
Other precedential impacts, of course, could be specified. 
A “legislative veto” is perhaps one of the most controversial reform 
options.162 State parties to an investment treaty would exercise this option to 
jointly disapprove an arbitral award prior to, or even after, its entry into force. 
Similarly, some advocate state-issued post hoc interpretive statements that 
would be binding on arbitral tribunals.163 
Not surprisingly, the proponents of ISDS arbitration condemn proposals 
that would markedly increase states’ control over the arbitral process. Such 
“re-statifying” reforms would, they argue forcefully, “undermine the 
credibility of investment arbitration as a neutral method of resolving a dispute 
between an alien investor and a host [s]tate.”164 Judge Brower’s comments at 
the AtlAS conference are representative of the opinions and positions espoused 
by many of the arbitration elite,165 as are several of his scholarly articles.166 In 
 
 159 State-to-state tribunals are permitted to accept amicus submissions from non-disputing parties. 2012 
U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 6, arts. 28(3), 37(2). 
 160 Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration, supra note 5, at 63–66. Professor Roberts notes 
that the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA provides that an investor-state tribunal “shall, on its own 
account or at the request of a disputing party, request a joint interpretation of any provision of this Agreement 
that is in issue in a dispute.” Id. at 65 (citing ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, 
art. 27(2), Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.asean.fta.govt.nz/assets/Agreement-Establishing-the-ASEAN-Australia-
New-Zealand-Free-Trade-Area.pdf).  
 161 Id. at 62–63. 
 162 E.g., Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, supra note 27, at 440–43. A 
description of the complications of such a veto in the context of a multilateral treaty are beyond the scope of 
this brief article, but Professor Yackee’s article provides an excellent analysis. Id. at 440–44. 
 163 Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 
104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 210 (2010). Some view these procedures as ploys by which to circumvent official 
amendment processes or as cynical attempts to limit liability in the face of existing or future claims. Roberts, 
State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration, supra note 5, at 53. 
 164 See, e.g., Brower & Blanchard, The Case Against Re-Statification, supra note †, at 48–50. 
 165 Charles N. Brower, Judge, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Need for Host States to ‘Let Go’ 
of the Arbitral Process, Presentation at the AtlAS Conference on Enhancing Business Opportunities in Africa 
(Nov. 3–4, 2014), http://arbitrateatlanta.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Need-for-Host-States-to-Let-Go-of-
Arbitral-Process.pdf. Judge Brower certainly is not alone in these views. As a number of scholars and other 
observers have noted,  
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his defense of current ISDS practices, Judge Brower strongly remonstrates that 
“[t]he objective of investment protection treaties is credibly to promise foreign 
investors a certain level of treatment in order to permit the treaty parties (or 
one of them) to attract foreign investment and to lower their cost to each [s]tate 
and its citizens.”167 
However, it is not foreign investors with whom states have contracted and 
to whom they have made promises; it is with their state counterparts. Even 
while rising to defend it, members of the ISDS elite recognize this distinction: 
“The possibility of direct action—international arbitration without privity . . . 
is dramatically different from anything previously known in the international 
sphere.”168 Historians suggest that the ICSID drafters did not contemplate the 
notion of arbitration without privity.169 In fact, the investor-state dispute 
resolution clauses in a number of early investment treaties appear to have 
considered the possibility of investor-state arbitration only in cases where 
separate written agreements between investors and host states existed, with 
state-to-state arbitration as the primary means of dispute processing.170 While 
drafting the ICSID Convention, the thinking appeared to be that a “situation in 
which a government . . . made a general statement that it would submit to 
arbitration a defined class of disputes with all comers [was] hardly ever likely 
 
[T]he more subversive analysts and commentators tend to be excluded from the actual workings 
of the IIL agency—they are not invited to the best conferences, they are not appointed to serve as 
arbitrators or as counsel, they are not hired by formal IIL agencies, such as ICSID, and their 
scholarship is ignored by those who are professionally or intellectually committed to maintaining 
the IIL agency in something close to its current form. 
Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, supra note 27, at 404. 
 166 See, e.g., Brower & Blanchard, What’s in a Meme, supra note 10; Brower & Blanchard, The Case 
Against Re-Statification, supra note †.  
 167 Brower & Blanchard, The Case Against Re-Statification, supra note †, at 52. 
 168 Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 256 (1995). 
 169 IAN A. LAIRD, BORZU SABAHI, FRÉDÉRIC G. SOURGENS & TODD J. WEILER, INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 106–07 (7th ed. 2014).  
 170 Id. at 108 n.29. These authors quote the 1976 Israel-Germany BIT:  
If both Contracting Parties are members of the [ICSID Convention] the arbitral tribunal provided 
for above may . . . not be appealed to insofar as agreement has been reached between the national 
or company of one Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party under Article 25 of the 
[ICSID] Convention.  
Id. (citing Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 10(8), June 24, 1976, http://investmentpolicy 
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1344). 
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to obtain.”171 Current views and practices on arbitration without privity 
seemingly, therefore, have evolved over time, influenced at least in part by 
jurisdictional decisions of arbitral tribunals.172 
Many states may not have appreciated the obligations to which they 
committed173 in early investment treaties or in the ICSID Convention.174 It is 
not surprising or unusual, then, that states may reevaluate their obligations in 
light of changed circumstances such as the potentially unexpected and 
unwelcome expansion of investment treaty jurisdiction. Their options for 
effectively addressing any dissatisfaction, however, are quite limited. One 
scholar has analogized the engagement of states with the ISDS system to 
membership in a club, with limited exit options.175 These exit options and their 
difficulties and limitations—the possible economic and political consequences 
of ignoring awards; the complications involved when replacing or amending 
existing treaties; and the survival of obligations following, and political 
implications of, termination or denunciation—have been reviewed thoroughly 
by others,176 but they do not appear to offer states a significant voice to effect 
or influence system reform. 
ISDS advocates argue that “governments sometimes enact misguided, 
discriminatory, and harmful policies and that officials sometimes implement 
regulations in faulty ways.”177 However, this sentiment can also be said to be 
true for arbitral tribunals. 
[An arbitrator] is not simply deciding disputes; he is making policy. 
While I have no reason to doubt [the arbitrator’s] exceptional 
capabilities in either role, it is increasingly difficult to support the 
position that [arbitrators] in the [international investment law, or IIL] 
agency should have the final word on what IIL policy should be. 
States do and should have an important role to play. The key question 
is one of institutional design: how might we amend the IIL system in 
order to ensure that states retain or enhance their role as the ultimate 
 
 171 Puig, supra note 29, at 541 n.30 (quoting Memorandum of the Meeting of the Committee of the Whole 
(Dec. 18, 1962), in 2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 59 (1968)). 
 172 Cf. LAIRD ET AL., supra note 169. 
 173 If investment arbitration is viewed as an intergovernmental organization or club with a rapidly 
expanding membership, many member states may have joined without appreciating the consequences of their 
membership. Katselas, supra note 151, at 320. 
 174 See Paulsson supra note 168, at 257. 
 175 Katselas, supra note 151, at 335–61.  
 176 See generally id. 
 177 Brower & Blanchard, The Case Against Re-Statification, supra note †, at 53. 
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deciders of IIL rules, without completely abandoning the benefits that 
binding dispute settlement by experts probably provides?178 
CONCLUSION 
One ISDS advocate has scoffed that reformers rely “on ideological 
assumptions and hypotheticals rather than demonstrating any actual harm from 
international investment law.”179 This really is puzzling to me—is it not 
legitimate for states to reconsider political choices that current officials or their 
predecessors have made, perhaps based upon changed circumstances? That is, 
it seems, a sovereign prerogative. As one commentator has stated, ISDS 
arbitrators “autonomously resolve core questions of public law . . . itself a 
fundamentally sovereign act [and the lack of any sort of legislative or 
administrative oversight or judicial or arbitral appellate process makes them] 
unaccountable in the conventional sense.”180 Is arbitration the proper venue to 
reconcile state regulatory control over its sustainable development objectives? 
I do not advocate a complete return to state-to-state diplomacy in matters of 
international investment,181 but I remain confounded by the arbitral bar’s 
strident denunciations of even minimal system adjustments that would increase 
the role of the state in the ISDS process. “[A] full ‘depoliticization’ of 
international investment disputes is no more possible than a full 
depoliticization of any other international legal issue.”182 It seems obvious that 
any system that cannot satisfactorily accommodate the interests of states and 
their citizenry as well as investors will lose the appearance of objectivity that is 
essential to its legitimacy.183 
While opponents of re-statification dismiss counter-arguments as “based on 
emotion rather than on facts,”184 there is inflammatory and insulting language 
being bandied about from all sides, none of which promotes a reasoned 
dialogue. “As commentators talk past each other, the conversation becomes 
 
 178 Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, supra note 27, at 445. 
 179 Brower & Blanchard, What’s in a Meme, supra note 10, at 699. 
 180 VAN HARTEN, supra note 148, at 156. 
 181 Cf. M. Sornarajah, Starting Anew in International Investment Law, in FDI PERSPECTIVES: ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 191–92 (Karl P. Sauvant & Jennifer Reimer eds., 2d ed. 2012), http://ccsi. 
columbia.edu/files/2012/11/FDI-Perspectives-eBook-v2-Nov-2012.pdf. 
 182 Katselas, supra note 151, at 320. 
 183 “The key to the investment treaty system’s sustainability lies in finding mechanisms to accommodate 
the interests of both entities instead of systematically privileging one.” Roberts, State-to-State Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, supra note 5, at 5. 
 184 See, e.g., Brower & Blanchard, The Case Against Re-Statification, supra note †, at 48–50. 
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fruitless.”185 The experience and perspective of a stellar group of arbitration 
professionals would be fruitful and would add greatly to this debate and to any 
reforms that might be implemented. Their refusal to engage may ultimately 
limit or minimalize their involvement in the process. The E.U. Commission’s 
TTIP draft text, for example, has been judged to be “a defeat for lawyers, and 
in particular arbitration lawyers, [who may be perceived to have failed] in 
dealing with such disputes.”186 
The “re-statification” debate and any resulting system modifications also 
would benefit greatly from an arbitrator pool that more accurately reflects the 
broad geographic participation of nations in ISDS systems. Noted arbitrator 
and scholar Jan Paulsson warned that: 
Arbitration obviously cannot endure if those asked to consent to its 
authority are mystified and disaffected [and may be] rejected if it is 
perceived that while the arbitrants come from the four corners of the 
world, rights of advocacy and the power to decide are reserved to 
mandarins or high priests operating in a few dominant cities.187  
The responsibility for addressing the “diversity deficit” rests with all system 
stakeholders. 
Despite my perplexity, I hope that my observations demonstrate the quality 
of the AtlAS conference. Weighty matters were discussed, and, while perhaps 
not resolved, were given voice; they were debated respectfully and animatedly 
by an impressive group of attendees. I was honored to be there. It was a 
wonderful opportunity for AtlAS and for the Atlanta and Georgia Bars to 
confirm that AtlAS is well placed to serve as a venue for the resolution of 
international investment and commercial disputes. 
 
 185 Puig, supra note 29, at 601. 
 186 Jonathan Goldsmith, A New International Trade Court, L. SOC’Y GAZETTE (Sept. 21, 2015), http:// 
www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/comment-and-opinion/a-new-international-trade-court/5051122.article?utm_ 
source=dispatch&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=GAZ-210915. 
 187 Jan Paulsson, Universal Arbitration—What We Gain, What We Lose, Alexander Lecture at the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/ 
articles/jan_Paulsson_Universal_Arbitration_-_what_we_gain_what_we_lose.pdf. 
